Seyhan, KubraAkleylek, SedatDursun, Ahmet Faruk2024-05-192024-05-1920242376-5992https://doi.org10.7717/peerj-cs.1960https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12713/5485In this article, a password-authenticated key exchange (PAKE) version of the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) post-quantum cryptography (PQC) public-key encryption and key-establishment standard is constructed. We mainly focused on how the PAKE version of PQC standard Kyber with mobile compatibility can be obtained by using simple structured password components. In the design process, the conventional password-based authenticated key exchange (PAK) approach is updated under the module learning with errors (MLWE) assumptions to add passwordbased authentication. Thanks to the following PAK model, the proposed Kyber.PAKE provides explicit authentication and perfect forward secrecy (PFS). The resistance analysis against the password dictionary attack of Kyber.PAKE is examined by using random oracle model (ROM) assumptions. In the security analysis, the cumulative distribution function (CDF) Zipf (CDF-Zipf) model is also followed to provide realistic security examinations. According to the implementation results, Kyber.PAKE presents better run-time than lattice-based PAKE schemes with similar features, even if it contains complex key encapsulation mechanism (KEM) components. The comparison results show that the proposed PAKE scheme will come to the fore for the future security of mobile environments and other areas.eninfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessPost-Quantum CryptographyPassword-Based Authenticated Key ExchangeLattice-Based CryptographyArticle1038660167WOS:001194917200003N/A10.7717/peerj-cs.1960